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Comments
APPROACHING STRICT LIABILITY OF INSURER FOR
REFUSING TO SETTLE WITHIN POLICY LIMITS
I. THE DILEMIMA
Conflicting interests must be served whenever insurance settle-
ments are negotiated. A direct conflict arises when an insurance
company has an opportunity to settle a claim against the insured
within the policy limits, the company declines the offer, and sub-
sequently a judgment is rendered in excess of the policy coverage.
The insured seeks redress against the company for that portion of
the judgment exceeding the actual coverage on the theory that his
liability would have been totally extinguished had the insurance
company accepted the offer to settle. On the other hand, the insurer
will argue that by litigating, the company seeks to lessen its own
liability within the policy limits. The courts have resolved who
must pay the excess judgment by determining whether the insurer
breached its "duty" to the insured by refusing to accept the settle-
ment offer.
Traditionally the insurer has been held liable to the insured
when the company fails to conform either to the standard of due
care, good faith or both in conducting the settlement negotiations.
The standards presently applied by the courts were adopted from an
early line of cases and are now the common law of almost every
state. These early generalizations were made in relation to the facts
and circumstances of particular cases under which the insurer's
conduct was appraised. Notwithstanding this early line of cases
the exact content for these standards with respect to all details of
application is not so easily settled. Perhaps the two standards are
really the product of too early an attempt to lay down a universal
proposition on the basis of a few particular cases.
A recent case in California has discredited the use of the two
standards as a universal proposition by taking favorable judicial
notice of a strict liability proposal.: Like all ideas, the proposed rule
emerges from the judicial process as a bare skeleton. The muscle
and flesh will have to be added through a variety of processes of
growth. Among these growth processes is further exploration by
courts and law reviews. An attempt to add some flesh to the pro-
posed rule is the purpose of this comment. To evaluate the pro-
priety of the proposal, an analysis of the early and present rules,
with their criticism, will be necessary.
1 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967).
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The questions under consideration are: (1) Because of this un-
avoidable conflict of interests should strict liability be imposed
upon a carrier who refuses to accept a sub-coverage offer? (2) If not,
in what circumstances is the company subject to liability in excess
of the policy limits? (3) Assuming liability is established, what
elements of damages are recoverable?
The problem is illustrated in the recent case, Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co.,2 in which the California Supreme Court took judicial
notice of the strict liability proposal and inferred that it may be
applied in the appropriate circumstances. The facts of the Crisci
case disclose that the defendant insurance company issued a 10,000
dollar public liability policy to the plaintiff-landlord. An injured
tenant brought suit against the landlord for 400,000 dollars as com-
pensation for physical injuries and a very severe psychotic condition
that allegedly resulted when a tread broke on a wooden staircase.
Before the trial, the insurance company refused one offer by the
injured party to settle for 10,000 dollars and later rejected a second
9,000 dollar settlement demand even after the landlord offered to pay
2,500 dollars of this amount.3 This refusal to settle was based on
the insurer's assumption that the physical injury was relatively
minor and that the jury would only believe the psychiatric evidence
presented by the insurance company. The case proceeded to trial
and the jury returned a verdict against Mrs. Crisci, the landlord,
for 100,000 dollars plus 1,000 dollars for the tenant's husband. The
insurer appealed unsuccessfully4 and then paid 10,000 dollars, the
limit of the policy, leaving their insured liable for the remainder.
After a settlement with the injured party, in which Mrs. Crisci
assigned her cause of action against the Security Insurance Com-
pany, this action was initiated in the insured's name to recover the
excess amount over the policy limits. In this excess judgment
action, the trial court awarded the plaintiff 91,000 dollars against
the insurance company for wrongful refusal to settle and also
awarded 25,000 dollars for mental suffering. This judgment was
affirmed on the principle of stare decisis and concluded that the
adoption of the amicus curiae proposal for strict liability was
unnecessary under the particular facts of this case.
2 Id.
3 The court did not infer any evidence of bad faith of the insurer by
Mrs. Crisci's offer to contribute to a settlement within the policy limits.
See note 25 infra for elements which may indicate bad faith.
4 Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
Note that Cresci in the 1962 litigation appears as Crisci in the 1967 case.
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II. PRESENT STANDARDS OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
A. LIABIImT
The question of whether an insurer can be held liable in excess
of policy limits has been the subject of litigation in most jurisdic-
tions. Generally, liability insurance policies contain no express
provisions requiring the insurer to accept an offered settlement.
In most insurance forms the only pertinent language concerning
settlement is found in the basic insuring agreement at or near the
beginning of the policy. The typical policy contains provisions
which vest in the insurer the exclusive right to decide whether a
claim against the insured should be settled or litigated.5
Initially, opinions seemed to hold that the insurer is not liable
under any circumstances to consider the interests of the insured in
accepting a settlement offer and that the policy coverage limit was
the only possible liability.6 Opposing argument unsuccessfully at-
tempted to impose upon the insurer an absolute duty to settle, if
an offer was made within the policy limits.7 Both of these positions
of no liability under any circumstances and absolute duty to settle
have been rejected by the majority of courts today.
5 That involved in the Crisci case and the typical liability insurance
policy contain a provision substantially as follows: "As respects the
insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy.., the company
shall: (a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury,
sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on account
thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the
company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of
any claim or suit as it deems expedient...." Keeton, Liability Insur-
ance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L REv. 1136, 1137, n.1
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
6 Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503
(1899); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577
(1923); Schmidt v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914)
(In these early cases it is not apparent whether the insured ever sought
liability on the negligence or bad faith theory).
7 There are no decisions which have expressly held that there is an
absolute duty to settle within policy limits, and the argument has
been rejected in favor of liability under either bad faith or negligence.
See Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808
(E.D.S.C. 1939) (Saying a rule of strict liability would open the door
for fraud and collusion, and increase premium charges); Georgia Cas.
Co. v. Cotton Mills Products Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931) (re-
jecting the theory that duty of insurance company to settle was
absolute); Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa.
286, 90 A. 653 (1914) (held no liability in absence of a showing of bad
faith or negligence); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
98 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899) (rejecting argument that complete control
over settlement required liability for any excess judgment); Noshey
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Anchored between these two extremes is the present view
requiring the insurer to give some consideration to the interests of
the insured when negotiating a settlement. The rationale behind
the imposition of a duty is that the company's decision affects the
interests of the insured; therefore, the company should be required
to assume a certain responsibility for the right to exercise this
control.8 If the offer to settle is near the amount of the policy
limits, when the company decides to litigate, the insured is involun-
tarily burdened with the bulk of the risk and simultaneously is
deprived of any participation in the decision. This resulting
inequality of position is what prompted the courts to conclude very
early that at least some protection must be given the insured despite
any contractual provision to the contrary.9
The California courts have adopted similar reasoning in prior
cases, and the Crisci court reaffirmed this position saying:
[I]n every contract, including policies of insurance, there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party
will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement; ... that the implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle in an
appropriate case although the express terms of the policy do not
impose the duty .... 10
This court-imposed duty is usually treated as one sounding in tort
rather than contract; however, it has been noted that the distinction
is rarely essential to a decision."
Merely acknowledging this duty has not solved the present
problem. In testing the minimum amount of consideration an
insurer must give the insured's interest to meet its legal obligation,
the courts have experienced difficulty. Multi-standards have re-
v. American Auto Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934) (rejecting argu-
ment that failure to accept settlement offer breached implied contract
to so accept); Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115
N.E. 348 (1917) (in absence of fraud, liability could not be based upon
failure to settle); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162
Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916) (no agreement could be implied from
the policy).
8 E.g., Ga. Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); 13 U.
CHI. L. REv. 105 (1945).
9 Keeton, supra note 5, at 1138.
10 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
11 Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against his Liability Insurer,
13 VAD. L. REv. 837, 838 (1960). But see Comunale v. Traders & Gen-
eral Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) and comments on the
California position in 10 HAST. L.J. 198 (1958); 32 S. CAL. L. REv. 314
(1959).
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suited from this confusion.12 Some courts have announced that the
company must sacrifice its interests before the insured's.1 3 Other
jurisdictions do not require the insurer to take note of the insured's
interests, 4 or state that the insurer may weigh its own interests
heavier.'5 A compromise position has arisen in other jurisdictions
which required equal consideration to be given the insured's inter-
est.16 The present majority of the courts have adopted this latter
position,'17 including the Crisci court which stated:
[I]n determining whether to settle the insurer must give the inter-
ests of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives to its
own interests; and that when "there is great risk of a recovery
beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable manner of
disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be made with-
in those limits, a consideration in good faith of the insured's in-
terest requires the insurer to settle the claim.... In determining
whether an insurer has given consideration to the interests of the
insured, the test is whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the settlement offer.'3
The courts have adopted two approaches upon which liability
for failure to settle will be imposed. The two lines of authority stem
from the central issue of whether the insurer's obligation is only
to act in "good faith '19 or whether the company must come up to a
12 Keeton, supra note 5, at 1142.
13 E.g., Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
346 (1933); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 1750
(1950).
14 Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451,
160 N.E. 911 (1928); Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645,
225 N.W. 643 (1929).
15 Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W.
1081 (1916).
16 American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir.
1949) (at least equal consideration); National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt,
203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948) (at least as much).
'7 American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir.
1949); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404
(1957); Boerger v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 257 Minn. 72, 100 N.W.2d
133 (1959); Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d
223 (1957).
18 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
19 "Good faith implies honesty, fair dealing and full revelation. ... Bad
faith implies dishonesty, fraud and concealment .... Neither mistaken
judgment nor unreasonable judgment is the equivalent of bad faith.
... As a consequence, liability upon the part of the insurer for refusal
to accept an offer of settlement may not be predicated upon its failure
to correctly predict the outcome of the action it is defending." Davy v.
Public Nat'l. Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 396, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-93
(4th Dist. 1960); Olson v. Union Fire Insurance Co., 174 Neb. 375, 118
N.W.2d 318 (1962).
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negligence standard of "due care"20 in its actions. Variations in
the elements held to constitute bad faith, negligence, or both are
numerous, with some courts even holding that negligence is an
indication of bad faith.21 Aside from the difference in legal verbiage,
the results achieved are similar regardless of which theory is
applied.22
Although the number of jurisdictions is in a state of flux, Cali-
fornia follows the present majority position requiring a showing of
bad faith to hold the insurer liable.23 An extensive list of factors
which may indicate bad faith were set out in the California case of
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co. 24 as follows:
[T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of lia-
bility and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the insured
to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to properly
investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against
the insured; the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or
agent; failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise
offer; the amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in
the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of the insured in inducing
the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as
to the facts; and any other factors tending to establish or negate
bad faith on the part of the insurer.25
20 "In all matters pertaining to the questions in litigation... it ought to
be held to that degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in the management of his own business;
and if an ordinarily prudent person, in the exercise of ordinary care,
as viewed from the standpoint of the assured, would have settled the
case, and failed or refused to do so, then the agent ... should respond
in damages." G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Texas Comm'n of App. 1929); Dumas v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947); See also Douglas v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
21 See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 186 (1955), noting that in many cases the
courts have equated bad faith with negligence, or at least held that
negligence was an element of bad faith.
22 "The question is always: 'Did the insurer exercise that degree of skill,
judgment, and consideration for the welfare of the insured which it,
as a skilled professional defender of lawsuits having sole charge of the
investigation, settlement, and trial of the suit may have been expected
to utilize?' If it did, there is no problem; it is not liable.... If it did
not, then a court could easily describe its conduct as being negligent,
or as not in accordance with the high duty of good faith which it
owed to its insured." 7A J. APPLEMAN INsURANcE LAW AmD PRACTIcE
§ 4712, at 562 (1942).
23 Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 178 (1955).
24 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957).
25 Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75. An extensive list was summarized in Jarrett,
Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INs. CoUNsEL
J. 58 (1961); also a number of these important factors were discussed
in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 266 (1955).
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Several earlier cases had equated the bad faith test to a showing
of dishonesty, fraud, and concealment. In an attempt to give further
concrete meaning to the elements that enter into a determination of
bad faith the Crisci court grounded the decisions on the proposition
that:
The language used in the cases, however, should not be understood
as meaning that in the absence of evidence establishing actual
dishonesty, fraud, or concealment no recovery may be had for a
judgment in excess of the policy limits.... Liability is imposed
not for a bad faith breach of the contract, but for failure to meet
the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.26
This duty to accept reasonable settlements, included within the
implied covenant of good faith, could approach absolute liability.
Liability under either the good faith or negligence standard is
dependent on the particular fact situation; therefore, these standards
may be broadened by the courts to such an extreme that absolute
liability is the result, although the terms good faith and negligence
will still be applied. This element of reasonableness may also have
been defined by the Crisci court. Whenever there is a rejection of a
settlement offer within policy limits, the refusal can be justified
only on the basis of the insurer's interests in most cases. Usually
any settlement within the policy limit would be the best approach
from the insured's position. Also, from the viewpoint of expecta-
tions in the purchase of insurance, the court further states:
[I]n light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the
usual methods by which an insured receives protection under a
liability policy, it may not be unreasonable for an insured who
purchases a policy with limits to believe that a sum of money equal
to the limits is available and will be used so as to avoid liability on
his part with regard to any covered accident. In view of such ex-
pectation an insurer should not be permitted to further its own
interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits
unless it is also willing to absorb losses which may result from its
failure to settle.27
Although the Crisci court acknowledged that adoption of the
strict liability proposal was unnecessary to the decision, apparently
the court was fully aware of the possible ramifications of its de-
cision. Taking favorable note of an amicus curiae brief and several
26 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17 (emphasis
added).
27 Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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law review articles,2 which urged the adoption of strict liability,
the court stated:
There is more than a small amount of elementary justice in a rule
that would require that, in this situation, where the insurer's and
insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may reap
the benefits of its determination not to settle, should also suffer the
detriments of its decision.29
Previously, it was noted, that most courts impose a duty on the
insurer, arising from an implied covenant in the contract, to con-
sider the interests of the insured. The present Crisci decision found
support for the absolute liability rule by stating: "[C] ontract duties
are strictly enforced and not subject to a standard of reasonable-
ness." Therefore, "the proposed rule is a simple one to apply and
avoids the burdens of a determination of whether a settlement
offer within the policy limits was reasonable."3 0
B. DAMAGES
The second major issue considered in the Crisci opinion was
the proper amount of damages recoverable in a successful excess
liability suit. The usual amount of recovery is limited to the excess
of the claimant's judgment over the policy limits.3' Attorney's fees
incurred by the insured which are related to the claimant's suit
have been allowed as damages.32 Fees incurred, however, in the
excess liability suit between the insured and the insurance company
have consistently been held not recoverable.33 Limited numbers of
previous courts have gone further in holding the insurer liable for
other types of damages. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Hender-
son 4 allowed recovery against the insured for destruction of the
insured's business, levied upon to satisfy the claimant's judgment,
in addition to the excess judgment over the policy limits. The
28 Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The court cited the fol-
lowing articles: Note, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482-485 (1966); Note, 60
YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1951); Comment, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 95, 102;
Note, 13 U. Cmr. L. REV. 105, 109 (1945). See also Keeton, supra note 9,
at 1183-86; 17 U. MAv L. REV. 557, 566 (1963).
29 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
30 Id. at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
31 Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 270 Ala. 119,
116 So. 2d 924 (1959); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d
679, 319 P.2d 69 (2d Dist. 1957).
32 E.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934).
33 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber Co., 140 Tex. 586, 169 S.W.2d
142 (1943); Christian v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D.
Cal. 1950).
34 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957).
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majority of cases still deny absolutely any recovery for conseqen-
tial damages.3 5
The question of whether the insured's cause of action lies in
contract or tort gains importance in determining the propriety of
the trial court's allowance of damages. The trial court awarded
Mrs. Crisci a judgment for the excess of the claimant's suit over
the policy limit plus damages for mental suffering incurred by Mrs.
Crisci. An earlier California case Comunale v. Traders & General
Ins. Co.,38 stated the action as "sounding in both contract and tort;"
however, the opinion was mainly based on the contract aspects. A
later case 7 drew the conclusion from ComunaZe that the California
rule did not permit a tort recovery. The conflict and difference of
opinion, both in the field of contracts and torts, is revived with the
Crisci decision. Normally, contract damages are awarded for mental
suffering only where the suffering accompanies a bodily injury,
where caused intentionally, or when wanton or reckless. Sometimes
similar results are reached with a merely negligent breach; how-
ever, such cases are limited to contracts involving deep personal
feelings.3 8 Most common of this type have been engagements to
marry, contracts for proper disposition of bodies, and contracts for
the delivery of death messages. Although it must be admitted that
damages are allowed in certain cases growing out of contract rights,
usually the injured party may, if he elects, bring an action sounding
in tort.
Against this background of prior case law the Crisci court has
now placed California with the majority and expressly overruled
any prior cases holding the action as one of contract only.3 9
Crisci expressly held that the action sounds in tort, and in re-
liance on Civil Code § 333340 allowed the insured to recover for all
detriment suffered. The court stated:
35 E.g., Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp.
808 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
20 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
37 Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr.
401 (rd Dist. 1964).
38 5 A. Commn, Comin oN CoNTRAC s § 1076, at 429 (1964).
29 66 Cal. 2d at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
40 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1954), "For the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where other-
wise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will com-
pensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it
could have been anticipated or not."
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In accordance with the general rule, it is settled in this state that
mental suffering constitutes an aggravation of damages when it
naturally ensues from the act complained of, and in this connection
mental suffering includes nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock,
humiliation and indignity as well as physical pain.41
So in accordance with California's general rule of damages, the
unanimous court upheld the allowance of damages for mental suffer-
ing incurred by Mrs. Crisci stating:
We are satisfied that a plaintiff who as a result of a defendant's
tortious conduct loses his property and suffers mental distress
may recover not only for the pecuniary loss but also for his mental
distress. 42
Although the present court overruled the earlier cases holding
the action was solely in contract, it is questionable whether Cali-
fornia has completely rid itself of all such actions in contract. The
same court later draws an analogy to the breach of contract cases,
allowing contract damages for a wormy funeral casket, stating:
Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance ... is
the peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of an
accidental loss, and recovery of damages for mental suffering has
been permitted for breach of contracts which directly concern the
comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties. (Chelini
v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 482 [196 P.2d 915].)4 3
Punitive damages were not allowed by the court; although, the
trial court indicated that had they found a reckless disregard for
the insured's rights, such damages would have been proper.44
III. CRITICISM OF PRESENT LIABILITY STANDARDS
The present standards used by the courts have been attacked
bitterly on several grounds by writers45 and judges. First, the critics
claim that courts tend to merge bad faith and negligence until the
distinction between the two standards is more apparent than real.46
Second, no workable standard exists upon which to base the deter-
mination of the necessary elements for either bad faith or negli-
41 66 Cal. 2d at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
42 Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
43 Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
44 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (No. 526251, San Francisco Super. Ct., Oct.
23, 1964).
45 The standards have been attacked for various reasons in Appleman,
Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100
(1938); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement,
67 HARv. L. Rnv. 1136 (1954); 17 U. AIam L. REv. 557 (1963).
46 Appleman, supra note 45, at 111.
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gence.47 The California cases are evidence for these first two attacks.
The first California appellate decision, Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,48
established a bad faith standard.49 Only a year later, the California
Supreme Court decision of Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co.,50
while following the Brown bad faith rule, established a divergent
definition of bad faith.51 Therein the court's standard is much like
the ordinary definition of negligence. The liability standard estab-
lished in Comunale requiring reasonableness under all circum-
stances has been followed in all subsequent California cases.r2
Confusion is thus evident, as the courts are stating that bad faith
is not negligence, but if an insurance company does what is un-
reasonable, it is acting in bad faith. Paradoxically, California
expressly states that they do not apply the negligence standard.53
In attempting to apply these generalized standards, the Cali-
fornia courts have used two factual questions: (1) Would the
insurer have settled had the policy been unlimited? (2) Did the
insurer give as much consideration to the insured's interests as it
47 Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 KY.
L.J. 100, 109 (1938).
48 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 688, 319 P.2d 69, 74 (2d Dist. 1957).
49 "substantial culpability ... bad faith rather than mere negligence." Id.
at 688, 319 P.2d at 74.
50 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
51 "When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so
that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settle-
ment which can be made within those limits, a consideration in good
faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer to settle the claim."
Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201 (emphasis added).
52 E.g., Martin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, 39
Cal. Rptr. 342 (1st Dist. 1964); Kelly v. British Commercial Ins. Co.,
221 Cal. App. 2d 554, 34 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1st Dist. 1963); Palmer v.
Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1st Dist.
1963).
53 "A determination respecting ... good faith involves an inquiry into
motive, intent and state of mind." Davy v. Public Nat'l. Ins. Co., 181
Cal. App. 2d 387, 397, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 493 (4th Dist. 1960). Earlier in
this same opinion the court stated: "The refusal to accept a proposed
settlement which, under all of the circumstances, is reasonable, consti-
tutes a failure to exercise good faith .... Stated otherwise, an unwar-
ranted or unreasonable rejection of an offer of compromise constitutes
bad faith.... On the other hand, the duty to exercise good faith is not
commensurate with the duty to exercise the care of an ordinarily
prudent person under the same circumstances. Bad faith and negli-
gence are not legally synonymous .... Neither mistaken judgment nor
unreasonable judgment is the equivalent of bad faith." Id. at 394-96,
5 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
54 E.g., Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 900, 42
Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (1st Dist. 1965).
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did to its own? 55 With these two questions the jury is in effect
asked to reevaluate decisions made by experts-the company's
attorney and claims manager. 50 The court's submission of these
issues to a jury culminates as the third major weakness in the
practical application of either standard.57 Determination of the
excess liability issue is based mainly on testimony regarding the
credibility and character of the insurer's acts rather than objective
facts. This is unlike the jury function in the normal negligence
action; therefore, either standard is unworkable in actual practice.58
Despite criticism, most courts persist in submitting these issues to a
jury.59
Fourth, in submitting this issue to the jury in the excess liability
suit, hindsight will likely influence the verdict, and since both
standards are based essentially on questions of fact, appellate
reversal is unlikely.60 In addition, the attention of the jury is sel-
dom directed to the fact that the insurer's decision to litigate was
not accompanied by a proportionate share of the risk; and the
insured, who may ultimately be liable for the excess judgment,
did not participate in the decision not to settle.5 1
At least one author has maintained that a greater duty than
mere good faith should be demanded of the insurer since it holds
55 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958).
56 Note, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 477 (1966).
57 See Note, 13 U. Cm. L. REv. 105 (1945).
58 Appleman, supra note 45, at 111 wherein he stated: "No jury what-
soever is competent to consider such an issue when even attorneys,
experts in the field of personal injury and insurance law, might well
differ upon the question of due care by or good faith of the insurer
in such a situation." See also note 53 supra.
59 In Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 374,
127 A. 708, 710 (1924) the court stated: "It is also urged that the issue
of negligence in this case is one that could not be fairly and intelli-
gently passed upon by a jury, that it involves intricate questions of
law not within the understanding of jurors, and upon which they could
not pass in any event without the aid of expert testimony. The extent
of the right to trial by jury is settled .... With some exceptions which
do not bear upon the present controversy, the right to trial by jury
in suits at law is absolute." But see Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156
Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1st Dist. 1958) (bad faith of company
and attorney found as matter of law); Comunale v. Traders & Gem
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (company refused settle-
ment offer and refused to defend under the policy; held, only question
of fact was reasonableness of settlement offer).
60 See note 59 supra.
61 Note, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1436 (1955).
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itself out as a professional. 62 The typical argument is that when
the insurer, in order to protect itself, pursues a course of conduct
that exposes its insured to greater liability, it cannot reasonably be
said to be fulfilling its contractual obligations in good faith and
should therefore be held for any excess judgment incurred.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON AN ABSOLUTE LIABILITY STANDARD
One solution which could solve many of the problems previously
discussed is to make the company strictly liable without regard to
fault for the entire judgment if the company declines to accept a
subcoverage offer to settle. The Crisci court took favorable notice
of several law reviews63 and amicus curiae briefs soliciting the
adoption of strict liability. Nevertheless, the court stated that
affirmance is dictated by relying upon Comunale, so: "We need not
... here determine whether there might be some countervailing
considerations precluding adoption of the proposed rule .... ,,64 Al-
though reference to these proposals was dictum, a full-fledged
discussion of the strict liability proposal is now advantageous for
analysis and comparison.
As suggested by the various writers, the ideal solution is to
narrow the question for the jury and attempt to make the problem
predominantly a question of law.65 This has the advantage of cer-
tainty and nondependence of fact issues regarding the nature of the
insurer's conduct. Several proposals suggest the insurer can elect
to settle or not, but the risk of an excess judgment would be on
the insurer.66 The jury's only role under this proposal would be to
determine if there had been a non-collusive offer of settlement.
62 See 7A J. APPLEmAw INSURANCE LAW AN PRAcT E § 4687, at 479-8D
(1962); "[The insurer] is a professional which advertises by all media
of mass communication its skill in the investigation, settlement, and
litigation of liability cases. It asks the individual.., to substitute its
skill for his, its judgment for his judgment, and its conduct for his own
acts. It then becomes chargeable with a greater duty-even as the brain
surgeon must exercise a greater knowledge, judgment, and skill in a
brain operation than would a general practitioner of medicine .... It
is not a comfortable spot for a liability insurer to occupy, but it seeks
the business upon the basis of its skill."
63 See note 28 supra.
64 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
65 See Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation,
26 Ky. L.J. 100, 111 (1938); Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to
Defend or to Settle, 28 INs. CouNsEL J. 58, 63 (1961); Comment, 4B
MicH. L. REV. 95, 100-101 (1949).
66 This solution has been suggested in 48 MIci. L. REV. 95, 99-100 (1949);
13 U. CHm. L. REv. 105, 109-10 (1945); 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1951);
18 STAN. L. REv. 475, 482-85 (1966).
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Professor Keeton, in one of the more extensive articles written
on this subject, favors a different solution. This proposal consists
of dual limits. The lower limit, of no duty to consider the interests
of the insured, applies if no firm offer of settlement is made; and the
higher limit, of making the company absolutely liable, applies if a
firm settlement offer is refused. 1 The essence of this proposal is
actually an express recognition of absolute liability similar to the
other proposal. Merits of this suggestion are only found in the
requirement, as a condition precedent to recovery, of offer of settle-
ment; and without this offer, no liability attaches. Theoretically,
this condition of tendering a firm offer of settlement would be
implemented in any of these proposals.
The underlying rationale of these proposals is to prevent the
advantages gained by the insurance company when it alone has
strategic control of the case. By retaining strategic control, the
gamble of litigating under the negligence or bad faith theory is
dwarfed. The insurance company may win a verdict, and in any
event can lose nothing more than the amount of the policy limit
and the cost of an unsuccessful defense, unless the insured recovers
in an excess liability suit.
When exclusive control by the company is renounced, the basis
for imposing excess liability is removed. Any rule allowing the
insured to bind the company in a settlement would, however, en-
courage less prudent settlements at higher figures. From the view
of public interest in effective operation of the insurance mechanism,
this is a disadvantage. Insurance costs could rise, since settlements
made by the insured and reimbursed by the company would neces-
sarily be reflected in higher rates.
Unless both parties are required to agree to a settlement, which
may be impossible, the only reasonable alternative existing under
the present system would be to allow the insurance company to
retain its present control. Absent any reasonable alternative, with
the retention of control the risk of paying for any subsequent harm
may ultimately rest upon the company in the near future. Even if
the proposed rule were adopted, it would not compel the company
to accept all settlement offers; rather, it only requires that the entire
risk of a subsequent judgment exceeding those policy limits would
be on the company.
This risk is presently being borne by the insurance company in
many cases today. As a consequence of the present difficulty in
67 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAiv.
L. REv. 1136, 1183-85 (1954).
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formulating and applying any valid standard, the courts have sub-
jected the insurer to the equivalent of absolute liability in many
cases. There being almost no degree of predictability, the insurer
is faced with a duty to settle with nothing but the jury's determina-
tion of "good faith" or "negligence" to protect it from the conse-
quences of a refusal to settle. Supported by the past fourteen
decisions on excess liability in California, with only one holding for
the insurer,"" one author 69 concluded that the insurance company
will be held liable on a bad faith refusal to settle if it makes a "bad
guess plus one.17 0 This has not, however, proven to be a universal
prediction; since Nebraska,7' under a bad faith test, has consistently
denied recovery against an insurance company.
All of the arguments supporting absolute liability-reduction
of litigation between the insured and the insurance company, the
company's complete control over the decision concerning settlement,
the ability of the insurer to shift or spread any loss, elimination of
the unenlightened jury question, relief for the policyholder from
excess judgments, decrease in the time and cost of handling the
claim-apply in full force to most excess liability cases. Notwith-
standing the force of these arguments, the courts have been reluc-
tant to implement them as the rationale for their decisions, just as
the courts are reluctant to extend absolute liability in any other
area of the law.
Perhaps one reason for this reluctance is that "there is an irre-
ducible risk of harm which can't be avoided, a risk which a reason-
able man would take .... ,,72 Because refusal to settle has some
utility in the sense that it is essential to combat flagrant, false and
vexatious claims, this argument has some merit. In other words, the
insurance company's decision to contest, rather than settle, is an
activity which may be valuable to the community.7 3 But, in every
case, the company will attempt to protect its own interests, and
since it is difficult or impossible to measure this factor, the best
solution would still be to hold the company absolutely liable.
08 Hodges v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr.
17 (2d Dist. 1961).
09 Note, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1966).
70 Id. at 477-79.
71 Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n., 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir.
1939) (For defendant insurer); State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v.
Bonacci, 111 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1940) (For insurer; if the insured's own
actions are the cause of the insurer's failure to settle, the insurer
cannot be held for bad faith); Olson v. Union Fire Insurance Co., 174
Neb. 375, 118 N.W.2d 318 (1962) (For defendant insurer; no showing
of bad faith).
72 L. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 40 (1941).
73 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 14-16 (3d Ed. 1964).
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The strict liability rule would also eliminate the arbitrariness
resulting from hindsight decisions. The very fact the claimant won
an excess verdict, after offering to settle within policy limits, is a
difficult obstacle to overcome in defending either a charge of bad
faith or negligence. The Crisci court stated:
The size of the judgment recovered in the personal injury action
when it exceeds the policy limits, although not conclusive, furnishes
an inference that the value of the claim is the equivalent of the
amount of the judgment and that acceptance of an offer within
those limits was the most reasonable method of dealing with the
claim.74
Under the proposed rule, failure to settle would afford a conclusive
presumption and in itself establish liability. The court's only role
in the excess liability suit would be to decide whether or not there
had actually been a non-collusive offer to settle. An absolute
obligation to settle eliminates all questions of fact involving good
faith or reasonableness, and would also render irrelevant any
question of how a prudent insurer without policy limits would have
reacted to the settlement offer.
Under this proposal, any extra cost of paying these claims will
not be cast on the individuals who incurred them, but will be
distributed over the whole group of policy holders carrying insur-
ance for this type of risk.75 The questions of utmost importance
then are: How much will this extra cost add to the premiums?
Whether on a balancing of this and other pertinent factors it is
desirable or just to "spread the risk" of the extra cost in this way?
Very few studies have been made as to the influence of a new rule
of law on existing premium rates. 76 Insurance companies themselves
do not even try to find out what part of their loss is attributable to
any given legal doctrine. Rates for a locality are computed on the
basis of gross losses paid out and a multitude of other factors, many
or most of them non-legal.7 7 The tendency of the court to write
74 66 Cal. 2d at 43, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (emphasis added).
75 "Of prime importance is the fact that whenever there is widely held
insurance, tort liability no longer merely shifts a loss from one indi-
vidual to another, but it tends to distribute the loss according to the
principals of insurance, and the person nominally liable is often only
a conduit through whom this process of distribution starts to flow."
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insur-
ance, 57 YALE L.J. 548, 551 (1948).
'76 McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo.
L. REV. 56, 87 (1940) (Concluded Missouri rates are high, but it is
hard to show how much if any is attributable to the humanitarian
doctrine).
•77 47 BEST INS. NEws, No. 11, 17 (1947) (claim consciousness of the pop-
ulus and standard of living were important considerations).
COMMENTS
opinions in legal concepts and doctrines, rather than in terms of
distribution of losses, obscures what the courts consider calculable
"enterprise" hazards in many situations.
Yet still another obstacle awaits us if we seek to impose a rule
of absolute liability. A recurring argument made by the insurance
company is that the decision to impose liability upon the insurer
will force the company to raise premium rates automatically. This
proposed rule would probably increase rates only a fraction, if at all.
A presupposition, even under the present doctrine, is that the com-
pany will accept any reasonable offer; consequently, under the
proposed rule there should be little, if any, added settlement ex-
pense. The end result would be interchangeable under both systems
if the insurer thinks the settlement offer is unreasonable, since he
would litigate. Admittedly, if the insurer loses, the company would
be liable for any excess, but even under the present system, the
insurance company is usually liable for the whole if only a mini-
mum of bad faith is shown. Conclusively, savings would result
from not having to defend an excess liability suit. Furthermore,
the insurer would not be exposed to damages for mental suffering
to the insured. Plus, reducing unpredictable losses to predictable
expenses would seem to more than offset any increase in disburse-
ments occasioned by this proposal.
Accompanying adoption of a rule of absolute liability, some
limit must be placed upon the elements of damages recoverable.
Therefore, from this analysis, two propositions can be deduced: (1)
The insurance company should be required to settle within policy
limits when it has an opportunity to do so. "Due care" or "good
faith" as criteria for an insurance company's liability for failure
to settle can only make unpredictable the outcome of the decision
not to settle. (2) The legal sanction, damages, for failure to settle
should be no more and no less than the amount of the excess
judgment-the amount which will place the insured in the position
he would have been without an unavoidable conflict of interest
between the insured and the insurer. It is not desirable to settle
all claims; therefore, with the adoption of the proposed rule of
absolute liability and the limitation of damages to the excess over
the policy limit, an insurance company would be able to evaluate
prospectively the amount of possible liability when it decides to
litigate.
Gilbert G. Lundstrom '69
